NOTE
Serving the "Apparently Under the Influence" Patron:
The Ramifications of Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc.
Kathryn M Knudsent
Given a choice between a rule that fosters individual responsibility
and one that forsakes personal accountability, we opt for personal
agency over dependency and embrace individual autonomy over paternalism.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a woman named Sue meets a friend for dinner at a restaurant in downtown Seattle. The restaurant is packed with customers, and
Sue decides to have a few beers. She is not loud, and she maintains her
outward composure. Given these facts, the bartender would probably not
be able to determine that Sue is intoxicated. He or she might subjectively determine, however, that Sue is "apparently under the influence"
of alcohol because close observation would reflect that her eyes are
slightly red and her breath smells faintly of beer. After a few hours, Sue
leaves the restaurant, drives off in her car, and hits a pedestrian. Under
the recently established standard set forth in Barrett v. Lucky Seven
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Saloon, Inc., 2 a court would probably determine that the pedestrian's injury was a foreseeable event, and the restaurant could be held liable for
serving Sue alcohol, even though she was not "obviously intoxicated" at
the time the restaurant served her.
A different individual-and well-known brawler-named Joe regularly drinks to excess at his neighborhood pub in a small town in Washington. One night Joe excitedly shows the bartender a switch-blade knife
he recently purchased. The bartender serves Joe several pitchers of beer.
Joe, like Sue, handles his liquor well and shows no outward signs of intoxication. Subsequently, Joe leaves the pub, gets into a scuffle across
the street, and stabs another man to death. Despite the foreseeability of
harm based on Joe's violent reputation, his new weapon, and his consumption of several pitchers of beer, the commercial vendor would
probably not be liable to the third party victim for over-serving Joe, because Joe was not "obviously intoxicated ' 3 and did not injure his victim
with an automobile. 4
If foreseeability of harm is the foundation of negligence,5 is it really
more foreseeable that Sue, and not Joe, would injure a third party, when
Joe brandished a weapon and neither party was "obviously intoxicated"?
Moreover, should we really presume that injuries caused by impaired
drivers are any more foreseeable than those caused by other impaired
tortfeasors?
In Barrett, the Washington Supreme Court erroneously expanded
commercial vendor 6 liability to third parties who are injured in automobile accidents by a patron who drives while impaired. 7 This decision
flies in the face of Washington vendor liability jurisprudence, which has
shown a reluctance to hold vendors liable for negligently serving alcohol;
prior to Barrett,courts would not do so unless the patron was a minor or
was "obviously intoxicated.",8
Nevertheless, Barrett rejected the
2. 152 Wash. 2d 259, 96 P.3d 386 (2004).
3. A vendor will be liable for a patron's criminal assault if the patron is "obviously intoxicated"
at the time of service and the vendor is on notice of the risk of harm. Cox v. The Keg Rests. U.S.,
Inc., 86 Wash. App. 239, 248, 935 P.2d 1377, 1382 (1997).
4. Cf Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479, 503-04, 780 P.2d 1307, 1319 (1989) (holding that
vendor serving underage patron who later assaulted patrolman was not negligent per se because
prohibition of alcohol sales to minors is intended to protect against automobile accidents caused by
driver error rather than criminal assault). Thus, a vendor will be liable if it serves a patron who is
"apparently under the influence" if that patron subsequently injures a third party with an automobile.
Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 271-72, 96 P.3d at 392 (citing Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479, 503, 780
P.2d 1307, 1319 (1989)).
5. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
6. For the purposes of this Note, a "commercial vendor" includes a bar, tavern, club, saloon,
restaurant, or any similar seller of alcohol in a commercial setting.
7. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d 259, 96 P.3d 386.
8. Estate of Kelly ex rel. Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 36-37, 896 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1995).
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common law "obviously intoxicated" rule in exchange for a new form of
civil liability based on a criminal statute that prohibits a commercial
vendor from serving a patron who is "apparently under the influence" of
alcohol. 9 Although the "obviously intoxicated" standard is highly preferable to the "apparently under the influence" standard, there are circumstances in which neither standard will suffice.10 Therefore, the Washington Legislature should enact the following standard of conduct to clarify
civil liability for commercial vendors: Vendors are liable when they
"knew or should have known" that the patron was intoxicated at the time
of service.'"
This Note is divided into five parts that collectively explore the history of vendor liability in Washington, the mistakes made by the Washington Supreme Court in deciding Barrett, and how best to determine
when a commercial vendor should be liable for an injury to a third party.
Part II provides the history of commercial vendor liability in Washington
and explains that liability traditionally attached only when the vendor
was on notice that injury to a third party may occur. Part III discusses
the Barrett opinion and how it expanded vendor liability by raising a
vendor's duty of care to third parties. 12 This higher duty shifts responsibility from the patron who chooses to drink excessively to the server.
Part IV argues that the court simply got it wrong. Instead of applying
sound legal reasoning, the majority succumbed to its desire to compensate the severely injured victim.' 3 The court's decision to stray from the
"obviously intoxicated" standard to the "apparently under the influence"
standard cannot be justified; the new rule conflicts with the general rejection of negligence per se as a form of recovery in Washington, the foreseeability-of-harm requirement in a negligence claim, the doctrine of
stare decisis, and the principle of legislative intent.14 Finally, in Part V, a
practical and applicable standard to determine liability is presented, as
are other possible solutions to the problems created by the Barrett decision.
II. VENDOR LIABILITY HISTORY IN WASHINGTON

The history of vendor liability in Washington reveals that, although
the sale of alcohol has consistently been regulated in one form or

9. See WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.200 (2006) ("No person shall sell any liquor to any person
apparently under the influence of liquor.").
10. See discussion infra Part V.
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 274, 96 P.3d at 393.
13. Barrett was "profoundly and permanently injured." Id. at 262, 96 P.3d at 387.
14. See infra Part IV.
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another, 15 the courts and legislature have been reluctant to attach liability
to a vendor unless the patron was "obviously intoxicated" at the time of
service. 16 This Part discusses the basic principles of negligence liability,
the important distinction between the "obviously intoxicated" standard
and the "apparently under the influence" standard, and the development
of vendor liability until Barrettwas decided.
A. The Basis of General Civil Liability
Under the law of torts, a person is liable for the injuries caused by
his or her negligence.' 7 A claim for negligence requires proof of duty
owed to the plaintiff, breach of that duty, and harm or damages that are
proximately caused by the breach.18 Litigants in vendor liability actions
dispute whether a commercial vendor is negligent for serving alcohol,
focusing on the elements of duty and proximate causation.' 9 A vendor's
duty arises at the moment the act of serving alcohol to a patron creates a
foreseeable risk of harm to third parties who may be injured by the patron. 20 The issue of proximate cause arises under the common law theory
that the impaired driver's conduct, not the act of serving alcohol, causes
the injury to the third party. 21
B. Dramshop Liability
The common law rule provided that a vendor who over-served a patron could not be liable for the patron's tortious acts 22-no matter how
much alcohol was served, or how foreseeable the patron's harmful action
was to the vendor-because it was the patron who decided to go to the
bar and drink to the point of intoxication.23 The rule was based on the
15. See infra Part II.B. Regulating drunken conduct has always been a priority in the City of
Seattle;
in fact, the
very first ordinance passed there
regulated drunkenness.
Seattle,
Wash.,
Ordinance
I
(Dec.
22,
1869),
available
at
http://www.cityofseattle.net/leg/clerk/kwikfact.htm#ordinances.
16. See infra Part II.E.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (laying out the elements required for a
cause of action for negligence).
18. Sheikh v. Choe, 156 Wash. 2d 441, 447-48, 128 P.3d 574, 577 (2006); see also W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).

19. See infra Part II.E.
20. See, e.g., Estate of Kelly ex rel. Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 41, 896 P.2d 1245, 1249
(1995) ("As a matter of public policy, we have premised the duty of commercial vendors on the need
to protect innocent bystanders from intoxicated patrons .... ").
21. Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 762, 458 P.2d 897, 899 (1969) (citing 30 AM. JUR. IntoxicatingLiquors § 520 (1958)).
22. See id (citing 30 AM. JUR. IntoxicatingLiquors § 521 (1958)).
23. In Barrett,Justice Sanders emphasized that
in the context of negligent over-service of alcohol, we must never forget that it is the
patron who insists on drinking, it is the patron who pays for the privilege, it is the patron
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premise that a commercial vendor cannot be the proximate cause of injury to a third party simply by serving alcohol.24 By shielding vendors
from proximate liability, the legal system held patrons personally accountable for their voluntary decisions to drink and their poor decisions
that resulted from drinking.
Nevertheless, the thinking on commercial vendor liability for serving alcohol changed over time. Such liability was established during the
beginning of the Prohibition era as dramshop25 acts were enacted.26 In
the 1830s, people abandoned hope that "drinkers would reform themselves," and prohibitionists attempted to eliminate the public's alcohol
supply through legislative means.27 While still a territory,28 Washington
enacted a dramshop act that allowed a civil cause of action against any
person or vendor that provided alcohol to an intoxicated person who then
caused injury to another. 29 Dramshop liability survived from 1879 until
1955, when the Legislature expressly repealed the statute.3 0 Although
legislative history fails to explain the rationale behind the repeal, courts
have consistently inferred that the repeal indicated the legislature's disapproval of third party recovery against a commercial vendor for serving
alcohol. 31 Consequently, injured parties searched elsewhere for compensation.

who imbibes to excess, and it is the patron-not the business-who voluntarily elects to
get behind the wheel rather than walk, take a taxi, or ride home with a sober friend.
Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 259, 280, 96 P.3d 386, 393-94 (2004) (Sanders,
J., dissenting).
24. Halvorson, 76 Wash. 2d at 762, 458 P.2d at 899.
25. A dramshop is "[a] place where alcoholic beverages are sold; a bar or saloon." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 531 (8th ed. 2004).

26. Laura Hoexter, Note, A Minor Hazard. Social Host Liability in Washington After Hansen
v. Friend, 68 WASH. L. REV. 227, 228 (1993).
27. Id. at 228 n.10 (citing Carla K. Smith, Note, Social Host Liabilityfor Injuries Caused by
the Acts ofan Intoxicated Guest, 59 N.D. L. REV. 445, 448 (1983)). Eventually, the prohibitionists
succeeded. The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the manufacture, sale, or transportation of liquor
in the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealedby U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
28. Washington was admitted as a state on November 11, 1889. Proclamation No. 8, 26 Stat.
1552 (Nov. 11,1889).
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.100, repealed by 1955 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 372, § I (original
version at Laws of Wash. 132, § 1 (1879)). Nevertheless, it has been reported that only four cases
involved commercial vendor liability after the dramshop act was passed. See Sheldon H. Jaffe, What
a Long Strange Trip It's Been: Court-CreatedLimitations on Rights of Action for Negligently FurnishingAlcohol, 72 WASH. L. REV. 595, 599 (1997).
30. 1955 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 372, § 1.
31. Estate of Kelly ex rel. Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 38, 896 P.2d 1245, 1248 (1995)
(affirming that the legislature rejected imposing liability by repealing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.24.100); Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 387-88, 755 P.2d 759, 762 (1988) (suggesting
that the repeal of WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.100 indicates "disapproval of... liability").
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C. Post-DramshopAct Liability
Even after dramshop liability was eliminated in Washington, the
Washington Liquor Control Board retained power to regulate liquor sales
"for the protection of the welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the
people of the state." 32 Since 1933, a Washington statute has prohibited
commercial vendors from serving a patron who is "apparently under the
influence" of alcohol.33 Vendors violating the statute face sanctions that
include fines, liquor license suspension or revocation, or imprisonment.34
Significantly, the statute remains silent as to the issue of civil liability,
even after amendments.35 After the dramshop act was repealed,36 the
legislative silence on civil liability forced courts to revert to the common
law rule that a commercial vendor does not owe a duty to a third party
because "it is not a tort to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to ordinary able-bodied men. 3 7 The common law rule prohibited vendor liability based on the premise that the injury resulted from the patron's initial
decision to drink to the point of intoxication, not the patron's "drinking
after [the point of] intoxication. ' 8 This rule recognized that people are
responsible for their actions, whether drunk or sober, and that, with limited exceptions, 39 the vendor's sale of alcohol was not the proximate
cause of the ensuing injury. 40 The limited exceptions that allow recovery
against a commercial vendor for serving a patron turn on the level of the
patron's drunkenness at the time of service.41
D. "Apparently Under the Influence" and "Obviously Intoxicated"
are Distinct Levels of Observable Drunkenness
In causal usage, the terms "apparently" and "obviously" may be
thought of as synonyms; under the careful examination of courts defining
the precise scope of a civil duty,42 however, the definitions differ
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 66.08.010 (2006).
33. Id.§ 66.08.200.
34. Id.§ 66.08.180; see also Washington State Liquor Control Board, Penalties for Violating
Liquor Control Laws, http://www.liq.wa.gov/enforcement/penalties2007.asp (last visited Nov. 10,
2007).
35. See § 66.44.200.
36.1955 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 372, § 1.
37. Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 762, 458 P.2d 897, 899 (1969).
38. Theresa J.Rambosek, Comment, A Wavering Line? Washington's Rules of Liability for
FurnishersofAlcohol, 24 GONZ. L. REV. 167, 199 (1989) (emphasis added).
39. See infra Part II.E.
40. Halvorson, 76 Wash. 2d at 762, 458 P.2d at 899.
41. See infra Part I.E.
42. These terms confuse even the Washington State Liquor Control Board. Its own website
reports violations as "allowing [an] intoxicated person to consume" and "sale to [an] apparently
intoxicated person."
Washington State Liquor Control Board, Violations Oct. 2007,
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significantly. The "apparently under the influence" standard greatly increases a commercial vendor's duty to the injured third party-a distinction in language that the Barrett majority recognized.43
The adverb "obviously" describes a characteristic with some certainty. 44 Something is obvious when it is "readily perceived by the
senses" and "hard not to perceive. 45 Such things can be easily seen,
heard, or smelled without much insight or reflection.46 Thus, obvious
intoxication must be "so simple and clear as
to be unmistakable" and
''7
A
discover.
to
easy
and
simple
"disappointingly
On the other hand, something that is "apparent" is merely "seemingly [or] evident[ly]" in existence. 48 Something is "apparent" when it is
"capable of being readily perceived" by the senses or "underst[ood] as
certainly existent or present., 49 Thus, it must not be simple or clear to
interpret, 50 but must rather "require[] at least some reflection and
thought.,
In short, a person is "obviously intoxicated" when he or she is "certainly" drunk, but a person is "apparently under the influence" when he
or she is "seemingly" drunk. 51 Prior to Barrett, third party liability did
not attach when a person was merely "apparently under the influence,"
under the theory that such a person did not lack will power and was still
responsible for his or her actions.52 The vendor's duty would arise only
when a person was "obviously intoxicated" and thus in a state of helplessness or debauchery such that he or she was unable to voluntarily control bodily actions.53 The majority's opinion in Barrett elevated a commercial vendor's duty by requiring reflection and inquiry into whether a
http://www.liq.wa.gov/violations/vltn07l0.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (emphasis added). The
Board's language choice is nonsensical because it combines the common law standard of civil liability with the criminal statute, when the only language the Board should be concerned with is the
"apparently under the influence" language set forth in its criminal statute. See also WASH. ADMIN.
CODE 314-11-035 (2007) (using the terms "under the influence" and "intoxicated" when interpreting
WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.200 (2006)); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 314-18-070(2) (2007) (using the term
"apparently intoxicated" for the standard of service under a banquet permit).
43. Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 259, 268, 96 P.3d 386, 390 (2004).
44. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1559 (2002).

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 102.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 259, 268, 96 P.3d 386, 390 (2004)
(citing Dickerson v. Chadwell, 62 Wash. App. 426, 435 n.4, 814 P.2d 687, 693 n.4 (1991)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 286-87, 96 P.3d at 397 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (citing 30 AM. JUR. Intoxicating
Liquors § 521 (1958)).
53. Id. (citing 30 AM. JUR. Intoxicating Liquors § 521 (1958)); Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d
911,916, 541 P.2d 365, 369 (1975).

392

Seattle UniversityLaw Review

[Vol. 31:385

person is under the influence at the time of service. 54 The "apparently
under the influence" standard is difficult to apply uniformly because it
requires significant subjective reflection and thought.55 Moreover, it rejects the notion that a vendor may simply rely on his or her senses to detect the patron's intoxication.
E. Vendor Liability to ThirdParties
Washington common law traditionally recognized vendor liability
to third parties for automobile accident injuries in two circumstances.
Liability would attach if a vendor served alcohol to either a minor 56 or an
"obviously intoxicated" patron.57
In the first circumstance, a vendor will be civilly liable for foreseeable injuries that result from serving a minor regardless of the minor's
level of intoxication. 58 The level of intoxication is irrelevant in this
situation because, unlike an adult, a minor may not lawfully purchase
alcohol. 59 A vendor is always in control of whether the minor is served
alcohol because minors "are neither physically nor mentally equipped to
handle the consumption of intoxicating6 liquor"; consequently, the vendor
always has a duty not to serve minors. 0
Before Barrett,the second circumstance in which a court would attach liability for third party injury was when a commercial vendor continued to serve a patron who was "obviously intoxicated., 61 The
54. An estimated 225 alcohol-related traffic deaths occurred in Washington in 2006. See
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,

2006 TRAFFIC SAFETY ANNUAL

ASSESSMENT-

ALCOHOL-RELATED FATALITIES, available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/. Although some may argue
that a higher duty is necessary in light of the high number of alcohol-related traffic deaths, increasing the civil liability standard for commercial vendors will not necessarily deter drunk driving-it
will deter the service of alcohol altogether, even to those who drink responsibly. The Barrett court's
standard does not help society remedy the specific problem of impaired drivers, and this Note argues
that commercial vendors should be liable for such accidents only when the commercial vendor
"knew or should have known" that the patron was "obviously intoxicated" at the time of service.
See infra Part V.
55. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 268, 96 P.3d at 390 (citing Dickerson v. Chadwell, 62 Wash. App.
426, 435 n.4, 814 P.2d 687, 693 n.4 (1991)).
56. Estate of Kelly ex rel. Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 36-37, 896 P.2d 1245, 1247
(1995).
57. Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 762, 458 P.2d 897, 899 (1969).
58. "It is illegal to sell minors alcohol[,] and if a vendor breaches this duty it will be responsible for the foreseeable injuries which result." Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Mkt., Inc., 134 Wash. 2d
468, 480, 951 P.2d 749, 755 (1998).
59. WASH. REv. CODE § 66.44.270 (2006).
60. Schooley, 134 Wash. 2d at 476, 951 P.2d at 753.
61. See, e.g., Fairbanks v. J.B. McLoughlin Co., 131 Wash. 2d 96, 929 P.2d 433 (1997); Kelly,
127 Wash. 2d 31, 896 P.2d 1245; Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989); Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220, 737 P.2d 661 (1987); Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457,
716 P.2d 814 (1986); Barrie v. Hosts of America, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 640, 618 P.2d 96 (1980); Shelby
v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d 911, 541 P.2d 365 (1975); Halvorson, 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897.
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rationale for requiring a patron to be "obviously intoxicated" is that the
vendor becomes responsible for the patron's acts only if the vendor
serves a patron who is helpless, no longer in control of his or her actions,
and unable to decide whether to stop drinking. 62 At the point of obvious
intoxication, the patron presumably lacks the will power to control his or
her actions. 63 The vendor then becomes legally responsible for the patron's actions because the vendor observed the obvious intoxication but
served the patron anyway. 64 The act of serving alcohol in this circumstance becomes the proximate cause of the ensuing injury because the
vendor is in the best position to prevent foreseeable harm. 6 5 The vendor
serhas a duty to stop serving the patron at that point because continued 66
vice increases the likelihood that the patron will cause harm to others.
For over thirty-five years the Washington Supreme Court consistently applied the "obviously intoxicated" standard to define when a patron lacks will power and to determine when the court will hold a vendor
liable for serving a patron. 6 7 For example, in Fairbanks v. JB.
McLoughlin Co., Inc., the court applied the "obviously intoxicated" standard to determine whether the furnisher of alcohol was liable for negligence when an employee was in an automobile accident following a
company banquet. 68 The injured bystander brought suit against the establishment and the patron's employer, claiming negligent furnishing of
alcohol. 6 9 The court noted that a witness's subjective observation of the
patron's intoxication soon after leaving the banquet could70 establish the
"obvious intoxication" requirement for a negligence action.
Additionally, the court used the "obviously intoxicated" standard to
determine that a commercial vendor does not owe a duty to the "obviously intoxicated" patron. 7' In Estate of Kelly ex rel. Kelly v. Falin, a
patron's family brought a wrongful death claim against a commercial
establishment for serving the patron when he was "obviously

The rule has also been applied to social hosts. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 755
P.2d 759 (1988); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).
62. Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 259, 286-87, 96 P.3d 386, 397 (2004)
(Sanders, J., dissenting) (citing 30 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 521 (1958)); Shelby, 85
Wash. 2d at 916, 541 P.2d at 369.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. 43 AM. JtR. TRIALS Liquor ProviderLiability § 4 (1991).
66. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 286, 96 P.3d at 397 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
67. Id.at288, 96 P.3d at 397-98.
68. Fairbanks v. J.B. McLoughlin Co., 131 Wash. 2d 96, 98, 102-03, 929 P.2d 433, 434, 436
(1997).
69. Id. at 99, 929 P.2d at 434.
70. Id. at 103, 929 P.2d at 436.
Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 42, 896 P.2d 1245, 1250 (1995).
71. Estate of Kelly ex rel.
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intoxicated."72 The court rejected the argument that the vendor owed a
duty to the patron but clarified the instances in which a commercial vendor owes a duty to third parties not to serve a patron.73 The court in
Kelly emphasized that a vendor must have notice of the obvious intoxication before a duty to third parties attaches.74 The court also stressed that
the individual who drinks must take personal responsibility for his or her
actions, and it rejected the use of Revised Code of Washington (RCW)
section 66.44.200 as the standard of care owed to a patron. 75 Both the
majority and dissent applied the "obviously intoxicated" standard to determine the point at which a commercial vendor must abstain from serving a patron. 76 The dissent, in its application of the "obviously intoxicated" standard, adopted the principle that the bartender must know that
the patron is intoxicated.77
Each of these cases, and the many before them that applied the "obviously intoxicated" standard,78 have implicitly been overturned by the
Barrettcourt's decision to expand vendor liability.
III. How BARRETT EXPANDED VENDOR LIABILITY

A. Case Background
On October 11, 1995, Jeffrey Barrett was severely injured in an accident caused by an impaired driver, Ned Maher. 79 A frequent customer
of the Lucky Seven Saloon, Maher had spent approximately three hours
there prior to the accident, during which time he drank at least two pitchers of beer. 80 He testified that he left because he felt a little "buzzed" and
was going to go home to watch a ballgame. 81 On his way home, Maher
fell asleep, crossed the centerline, and hit Barrett's vehicle. 82 Neither the
police officer at the scene nor Maher's treating physician believed Maher
72. Id. at 33, 36, 896 P.2d at 1246-47.
73. Id. at 39-42, 896 P.2d at 1249-50.
74. Id. at 37, 896 P.2d at 1248.
75. Id. at 39, 896 P.2d at 1249.
76. Id. at 37, 43, 896 P.2d at 1247, 1251.
77. Id. at 47, 896 P.2d at 1253 (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., Fairbanks v. J.B. McLoughlin Co., 131 Wash. 2d 96, 929 P.2d 433 (1997); Kelly,
127 Wash. 2d 31, 896 P.2d 1245; Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989); Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220, 737 P.2d 661 (1987); Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457,
716 P.2d 814 (1986); Barrie v. Hosts of America, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 640, 618 P.2d 96 (1980); Shelby
v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d 911, 541 P.2d 365 (1975); Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d
759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969).
79. Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 259, 262-63, 96 P.3d 386, 387 (2004).

80. Id.
81. Barrett v. Lucky 7 Saloon, Inc., No. 46688-7-I, 2002 WL 1608479, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App.
July 22, 2002).
82. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 263, 96 P.3d at 387.
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to be intoxicated.83 Maher admitted to drinking, however, and later tests
determined that his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit.84 After
Maher pleaded guilty to vehicular assault while under the influence of
liquor,85 Barrett sued Lucky Seven for negligently over-serving Maher.86
At trial, the jury found for Lucky Seven. 87 On appeal, Barrett argued that the trial court erred in applying the "obviously intoxicated"
standard in the jury instructions to define when Lucky Seven's duty not
to serve Maher ripened. 88 Barrett argued that the trial court should have
used the "apparently under the influence" standard set forth in the statute
providing for criminal liability. 89 However, Barrett did not use the statutory language in his original complaint and instead used the common law
language to argue that Lucky Seven served Maher while he was "obviously intoxicated." 90 Barrett's choice of language suggests that he knew
that the appropriate standard was "obviously intoxicated" when he filed
the initial complaint against Lucky Seven.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the verdict for Lucky
Seven, holding that the criminal statute did not create a basis for civil
liability. Instead, the court found that RCW section 66.44.200 was "intended as a licensing and enforcement tool." 91 This holding was consis-92
tent with the court's conclusion in 1991 in Dickerson v. Chadwell, Inc.,
in which a patron sued a commercial vendor under the "apparently under
the influence" standard. 93 Even though the assault in Dickerson did not
involve an automobile, the court elaborated on the distinction between
the common law duty and the criminal statute. 94 In Dickerson, the court
relied on past Washington Supreme Court decisions and emphasized that
83. Lucky 7, 2002 WL 1608479, at *2.
84. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 263, 96 P.3d at 387.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 266, 96 P.3d at 389.
88. Id. at 265-66, 96 P.3d at 389. The appellate court reviewed this issue despite the plaintiff's
failure to object at the trial level to the jury instructions that included the "obviously intoxicated"
standard. See id. at 281, 96 P.3d at 394 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (citing Report of Proceedings at 16,
Lucky 7, 2002 WL 1608479). The plaintiff's failure to make objections and failure to preserve the
record is an absolute bar to appeal on the issue under Washington Superior Court Civil Rule 51 (0.
id. Although there are significant procedural reasons why the state supreme court should not have
granted review of Barrett, this Note covers only the substantive review of the standard applied to
create civil liability.
89. Lucky 7,2002 WL 1608479, at *3.
90. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 283, 96 P.3d at 395 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (citing Clerk's Papers
at 187, Lucky 7, 2002 WL 1608479 (No. 46688-7-I)).
91. Lucky 7, 2002 WL 1608479, at *3 (citing Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220, 225, 737
P.2d 661, 664 (1987)).
92.62 Wash. App. 426, 814 P.2d 687 (1991).
93. Id. at 435, 814 P.2d at 693.
94. Id. at 428, 434-35, 814 P.2d at 690, 693.
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"[t]he duty such [commercial] establishments owe is consistently described as a duty not to serve alcohol to 'obviously intoxicated' persons." 95 The Dickerson court remanded on the basis that it was an error
to instruct the jury using the less stringent "apparently intoxicated" standard set forth in RCW section 66.44.200 instead of the "obviously intoxicated" standard.96 Nevertheless, Barrett appealed to the Washington
Supreme Court, maintaining his position that the trial court should have
influence" standard rather than the
applied the "apparently under the
"obviously intoxicated" standard. 97
B. The Supreme Court's Holding
On review, the state supreme court held that the statutory standard
that creates criminal sanctions for serving a patron "apparently under the
influence" 98 also defines the standard of care owed by commercial vendors to third parties in determining civil liability. 99 The court came to
this conclusion after applying section 286 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which provides a test to determine whether a legislative regulation
violation should also be the basis for civil liability. 00 According to the
Restatement, a court may adopt the statutory language as the standard of
conduct for a reasonable person when the purpose of the statute is
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that0 interest against the particular hazard from which
the harm results.'1
The Barrett court found that section 286 provided the basis for
Lucky Seven's standard of care, or duty owed to Barrett, because the
four requirements were met.' 0 2 The court determined that the purpose of
RCW section 66.44.200 was to protect the health and safety of the people

95. Id. at 434, 814 P.2d at 692 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 435, 814 P.2d at 693.
97. Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 259, 266, 96 P.3d 386, 389 (2004).
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.200(1) (2006).
99. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 273, 96 P.3d at 393.
100. Id. at 269, 96 P.3d at 390-91; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).

102. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 273, 96 P.3d at 392.
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of Washington,' 0 3 that Barrett fell into that protected class, and that he
accordingly had a cause of action based on the standard of conduct set
forth in the statute. 1°4 Further, the court held that the legislature created
the statute to protect third parties like Barrett from the physical and emotional injury caused by an impaired driver.10 5
Although the court reasoned that it had previously used section 286
to define standards of conduct owed to minors, 10 6 this was the first time
the court used it to define the duty owed to a third party who is injured
by an impaired adult driver based upon the statutory language of RCW
section 66.44.200.1 7 Furthermore, the court stated that it had previously
used section 286 in this manner only to show evidence of negligence, not
to establish a duty. 0 8 The court also held that the standard of conduct it
applied did not impose an additional burden because commercial vendors
had been required for over seventy years, under the criminal standard,
not to serve those "apparently under the influence."' 0 9 This determination overturns the holding in Dickerson in which the court of appeals
correctly emphasized the difference between the civil and criminal standards. 110
The Barrettcourt overlooked the fact that the standard of conduct it
created was, in fact, significantly different from that set forth in the
criminal statute because it provided a civil cause of action."' Adding the
possibility of civil liability to the criminal statute subjects the vendor not
only to fines, permit suspensions, and imprisonment,"11 but also to the
payment of damages to an injured third party in a civil suit." 3 The
court's adoption of the "apparently under the influence" standard was
incorrect, and it should not be applied to determine a vendor's duty to
third parties.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF

BARRETT: WHY THE "APPARENTLY UNDER
THE INFLUENCE" STANDARD SHOULD BE REJECTED

Four problematic consequences arise from the majority's flawed
reasoning in Barrett. First, a court is not required to apply the

103. Id (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 66.08.010 (2004)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.at 269, 96 P.3d at 91.
107. Id.(noting that the issue before the court was one of first impression).
108. Id.at 274, 96 P.3d at 393 (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. See infra Part IV.A.
11.See supra Part II.C.
112. WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.180 (2006).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965); see supra Part II.A.
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Restatement to create a standard for civil liability, 1 14 and the majority
should not have done so here. Second, the "apparently under the influence" standard amounts to negligence per se, a doctrine that has a narrow
application in Washington law. 1 5 Third, the standard disregards the6
firmly established requirement of foreseeability in a negligence claim."
Lastly, the holding is inconsistent with the principles of stare decisis and
legislative intent. 117
A. The Court'sApplication of Restatement
Section 286 Was a DiscretionaryMistake
The Barrett court erred when it incorporated Restatement section
286 into RCW section 66.44.200 in order to define the duty owed by a
commercial vendor."18 The relevant section reads: "The court may adopt
as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment .... "119 Comment (d) of section 286 states that when
a statute does not contain a provision for civil liability, the court is "under no compulsion to accept it as defining any standard of conduct for
purposes of a tort action."'120 This comment applies to Barrett because2
RCW section 66.44.200 does not contain a provision for civil liability.' '
Furthermore, the Reporter's Notes state that section 286 was specifically
changed in order to clarify that the court is not required to impose civil
122
liability unless such liability is expressed or implied from the statute.
The Barrett court made an erroneous discretionary call when it decided
to apply section 286 to the case before it.
The court was correct in stating that section 286 is an avenue to establish civil liability based on the language set forth in a criminal statute; 123 it has adopted this section sparingly in the past to define the duty
owed by vendors to minors. 24 When the court chose to apply it to the
conduct of serving alcohol to minors in Hansen v. Friend,12 5 however,
scholars criticized the application as faulty.' 26 The Barrettcourt justified
114. See infra Part IV.A.
115. See infra Part IV.B.

16. See infra Part IV.C.
117. See infra Part IV.D.
118. See Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 259, 274, 96 P.3d 386, 393 (2004).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965) (emphasis added).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d (1965).
121. See WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.200 (2006).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 reporter's notes (1965).
123. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 274, 96 P.3d at 393 (citing Callan v. O'Neil, 20 Wash. App. 32,
578 P.2d 890 (1978)).
124. See, e.g., Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 480-82, 824 P.2d 483, 485-86 (1992).
125. Id. at 480-81, 824 P.2d at 485.
126. See Hoexter, supra note 26, at 240-46.

2008]

Serving the "ApparentlyUnder the Influence" Patron

399

its application of section 286, as a means to establish civil liability when
an adult patron is served, primarily on the section's prior limited application in situations involving minors. 127 But a different standard of care
applies to adults because they have the capability to decide whether to
drive to a bar and drink. Minors, on the other hand, are presumed
in128
competent, and a vendor always owes a duty not to serve them.
B. The Court'sApplication of Restatement Section 286 Violates
Washington Law Because It Amounts to Negligence PerSe
The supreme court erred by failing to apply the common law standard to determine when a commercial vendor should be liable for injuries
to a third party. This Section explains the doctrine of negligence per se
and its limited acceptance in Washington law. It further explains how
negligence per se and Restatement section 286 are indistinguishable and
why the Barrett court should have declined to apply section 286 in the
context of vendor liability.
1. The Doctrine of Negligence Per Se
The doctrine of negligence per se provides an avenue for tort liability if a person violates a statute, or other legislative enactment, that was
created to protect against the type of accident that occurred, and the victim is within the class the statute was created to protect. 129 The doctrine
allows for a civil claim in circumstances when a civil cause of action is
not enumerated in the statute 130 by permitting courts to "substitute a
statutory standard of conduct for the less restrictive common law standard of reasonableness."' 31 Thus, if Washington were a jurisdiction that
indiscriminately embraced the doctrine of negligence per se, 132 a commercial vendor would be liable for harm to a third party resulting from
serving an "apparently under the influence" patron because, as the Barrett majority states, RCW section 66.44.200 was designed to protect innocent third party bystanders from over-served drivers. 133
But,

127. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 270, 96 P.3d at 391.
128. See supra Part II.E.
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 (Proposed Final

Draft No. 1 2005).
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d (1965) (explaining that it is within
the court's discretion whether violating a legislative enactment may result in civil liability when the
enactment is silent on the issue).
131. Mina v. Boise Cascade Corp., 104 Wash. 2d 696, 703-04, 710 P.2d 184, 189 (1985).
132. With limited exceptions, Washington has rejected the doctrine of negligence per se. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 5.40.050 (2006).
133. See Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 259, 273-74, 96 P.3d 386, 392
(2004).
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significantly, Washington enacted a statute limiting when negligence per
se may be invoked as a cause of action, and over-serving is not a factual
situation that invokes the limited application of the doctrine. 134
2. Negligence Per Se Has Limited
Application in Washington
In the 1980s the Washington legislature went through a period during which it recognized the need to protect business owners from excessive tort liability.13 5 Consequently, the Tort Reform Act was adopted in
1986 that, in part, limited a plaintiff's use of a statutory violation to show
only evidence of negligence.' 36 As part of the Tort Reform Act, the legislature explicitly eliminated the doctrine of negligence per se as a cause
of action through the enactment of RCW section 5.40.050, which reads
in part: "A breach of a duty imposed by statute, ordinance, or administrative rule shall not be considered negligence per se . . . . ,13 The statute
created four limited exceptions when a party will be found to have
breached a duty of care based solely on the fact that he or she violated a
standard of conduct created by a statute.1 38 These exceptions include
violating rules "relating to [1] electrical fire safety, [2] the use of smoke
alarms, [3] sterilization of needles and instruments used in tattooing or
electrology ... or [4] driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug."' 139 The act of over-serving40 a patron is not one of the
specific exceptions enumerated in the statute. 1
The exception that allows a plaintiff to establish negligence based
on the violation of a statute that prohibits the act of "driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor" is most relevant to the facts in Barrett.141 This exception, however, is explicitly aimed only at the irresponsible drinker's conduct of driving while impaired, not the vendor's conduct of furnishing alcohol. 142 Courts prior to Barrettheld that the statute
134. See § 5.40.050.
135. S. 49-4630, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1986).
136. § 5.40.050 (emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Fraser v. Beutal, 56 Wash. App. 735, 739-40, 785 P.2d 470, 478-79 (1990). Despite the
unambiguous distinction between the act of an impaired driver and the act of a commercial vendor,
the Washington Supreme Court has applied negligence per se doctrine to create a cause of action
when a vendor violates the standard of conduct set forth in a statute prohibiting the service of minors. See, e.g., Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Mkt., Inc., 134 Wash. 2d 468, 473, 951 P.2d 749, 751
(1998). This acknowledgment appears to be a stretch by the court based on policy since it is inconsistent with the statutory language.
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rejecting negligence per se is "clear and unambiguous" and refused to
43
expand the limited exceptions to include the act of furnishing alcohol. 1
Nevertheless, this is exactly what the Washington Supreme Court did in
Barrettthrough the use of Restatement section 286.
3. Negligence Per Se and Restatement
Section 286 Are Indistinguishable
Surprisingly, the Barrett court failed to recognize the unambiguous
connection between its application of section 286 and the doctrine of
negligence per se. 14 4 Evidence of the connection is exemplified by Restatement (Second) of Torts section 288B, other jurisdictions' recognition of the connection, the notes 45following section 286 itself, and Washington Pattern Jury Instructions. 1
Section 288B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: "The
unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which is adopted by the court as defining the standard of conduct
of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself.' 146 Furthermore, comment
(a) explicitly states that a standard of conduct adopted under section 286
"is negligence 'per se,' or in itself."' 147 Thus, when a court defines a duty
based on statutory language through the application of section 286, the
court is adopting
the doctrine of negligence as a matter of law, or negli14 8
se.
per
gence
The connection between section 286 and negligence per se is also
exemplified in the fact that the majority of courts properly recognize that
a plaintiff has a claim based on negligence per se when the four elements
under section 286149 are met.15 0 Even within section 286, the exemplary
cases following the case citations in the reporter's notes consistently refer to negligence per se to describe the cause of action created under the
143. Fraser,56 Wash. App. at 739-40, 785 P.2d at 478-79.
144. Other jurisdictions have recognized this connection, determining that once a legislative
enactment is defined as a standard of care under section 286, violating the statute amounts to negligence per se. See, e.g., Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, 964-65 (E.D. Wis.
1981).
145. See infra Part IV.B.3.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B(l) (1965); see also Nathan Isaac Combs, Civil
Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 241, 250 n.35 (2005) (explaining that section 286
defines the circumstances in which a violation of legislation amounts to negligence per se).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B cmt. a (1965).
148. See Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights ofAction, and Remedies: An IntegratedApproach,
76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 75 n.36 (2001) (noting that the standards of negligence per se were incorporated into section 286).
149. See supra Part III.B.
150. Kaye A. Pfister, Note, A Review of Shipowners' Statutory Duty Under Section 905(b) of
the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation Act: Does Scindia Require a Change in
Course?, 1983 DUKE L.J. 153, 160 (1983).
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section. 151 These courts correctly analyzed that defining a defendant's
duty under section 286 is indistinguishable from permitting a claim under
the doctrine of negligence per se.
A final example of the connection can be found in Washington Pattern Jury Instructions regarding negligence per se. 152 The jury instructions require that the court instruct the jury that the plaintiff must satisfy
the four elements of section 286 before the jury can find liability based
on negligence per se. 153 This instruction should apply only to situations
in which negligence per se is permissible-under the limited exceptions
in RCW section 5.40.050-to define the standard of conduct.
Although section 286 is not titled "negligence per se," negligence
per se and section 286 are not distinct theories of liability, but rather
identical ones-each defines a duty and creates a civil cause of action
based on a legislative enactment. 154 The Barrett court ignored this connection and instead used section 286 to get around the legislature's explicit prohibition of negligence per se as an avenue for a cause of action. 155 One possible explanation is that the court's decision allows a
plaintiff who is otherwise unable to prove common law negligence to
bring a cause of action. 156 The Barrett court, however, should have required Barrett to prove that Lucky Seven owed a duty under the common
law "obviously intoxicated" standard.
4. Negligence Per Se's Presence in Barrett and
the Requirement of a Common Law Claim
Barrett indirectly and impermissibly adopted the doctrine of negligence per se. The court determined, after applying Restatement section
286, that RCW section 66.44.200 defines the duty or "minimum standard
of conduct" owed by a commercial vendor to a third party. 157 Consequently, it created the rule that a violation of the criminal statute' 58 is also
a breach of the duty of care in a civil action against a commercial vendor. 5 9 The practical consequences of the court's decision make the

151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
152. 6 WASH. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, WASHINGTON PRACTICE:
WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL WPI 60.01.01 (5th ed. 2005).

153. Id.
154. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
155. Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 259, 274, 96 P.3d 386, 393 (2004).
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d (1965) (explaining that it is within
the court's discretion whether violating a legislative enactment may result in civil liability when the
legislative enactment is silent on the issue).
157. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 274, 96 P.3d at 393.
158. WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.200 (2006).
159. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 274, 96 P.3d at 393.

2008]

Serving the "Apparently Under the Influence" Patron

403

violation of the statute sufficient to establish negligence. 6 ° The court's
adoption of RCW section 66.44.200 as the standard of care was an indirect application of the negligence per se doctrine because the court
"look[ed] to statutes and regulations rather than common law to determine the existence and scope of an actor's obligation of care.''
Prior to Barrett, the rule was clear that the violation of a statutory
duty could only be used as evidence of negligence, and the plaintiff was
still required to prove that a common law duty existed in order to establish liability. 162 Based on the common law rule, the breach of a statutory
standard of conduct alone is insufficient to establish negligence because
it "resurrect[s] the doctrine of negligence per se." 163 Consequently, each
element of a negligence claim must be present to have a common law
cause of action.
In the commercial vendor liability context, the common law standard for establishing a negligence claim for violation of a duty of care to
third parties had consistently been the "obviously intoxicated" standard. 1 64 Barrett should have been required to prove the traditional elements of a common law vendor liability claim-including that the patron
was "obviously intoxicated" at the time of service. 65 Instead, the court
held that "the statutory standard establishes a standard for civil liability.''166 The court's declaration resolved the breach of duty issue that is
essential to establish negligence, which is exactly the role negligence per
se plays. 167 Thus, when the court established a standard of reasonable
conduct based on the language contained in RCW section 66.44.200, it
contravened RCW section 5.40.050's abolition of the negligence per se
doctrine.
Although the prohibition of negligence per se as a cause of action should have prevented application of the "apparently under the
160. When a plaintiff can establish the elements of duty and breach by proving a statutory
violation, the remaining element of causation is also essentially established, as the service of alcohol
establishes causation under the negligent service theory. Assuming proof of damages can be satisfied, a plaintiff's negligence claim is easily established under the doctrine of negligence per se. See
supra Part III.A.
161. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place
of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 743 (2001) (describing the doctrine of negligence per se).
162. Estate ofTempleton ex rel. Templeton v. Daffern, 98 Wash. App. 677, 687, 990 P.2d 968,
974 (2000).
163. Id at 686, 990 P.2d at 973.
164. See supra Part I.E.
165. See Templeton, 98 Wash. App. at 685-86, 990 P.2d at 973; see also supra Part II.E.
166. Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 259, 269, 274, 96 P.3d 386, 390-91,
393 (2004).
167.

DAN

B.

DOBBS &

PAUL

T. HAYDEN,

TORTS

AND

COMPENSATION:

ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 139 (5th ed. 2005).
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influence" standard, the court also failed to adequately consider its
decision's impact on the concept of foreseeability in a negligence
claim.
C. The "Apparently Under the Influence" StandardIs Inconsistent
with the ForeseeableInjury Requirement of a Negligence Claim
Even if the court did not recognize that it should have rejected the
"apparently under the influence" standard based on Washington's general rejection of negligence per se, it still should have rejected the standard because it does not satisfy the foreseeability of harm requirement of
a negligence claim.' 68 In Kelly, the court stated that "adults are expected
to temper their alcohol consumption or simply refrain from driving when
intoxicated."' 169 Yet, a long-established exception to that rule is that a
commercial vendor breaches a duty of care by creating a situation in
which harm to others is foreseeable.170 The moment in time when a vendor's duty arises based on foreseeable risk of harm to a third party is imperative because the vendor becomes liable for the conduct of another.'17
The foreseeability requirement in a negligence claim limits the
scope of the negligent actor's duty because it requires the actor to prevent only foreseeable risks of harm. 172 The "apparently under the influence" standard is inconsistent with this requirement because it minimizes
the level of observable intoxication that is required before a vendor's
duty arises.' 7 3 The standard assumes that even when the vendor serves
alcohol to a seemingly-but not obviously-drunk patron, it is foreseeable that the patron is going to leave in his or her car, get in an accident,
and injure someone. The standard requires a subjective inquiry or investigation by the commercial vendor and its employees to ensure that
someone does not "seem" under the influence before that person is
served. 74 Given the difficulty in determining whether a patron is "apparently under the influence," the standard imposes a broad basis for liability when injury from impaired driving may not be foreseeable or predictable.
A vendor has a duty not to serve a person based on foreseeability of
harm when the vendor is on notice that the patron is so intoxicated that
he or she is out of control and unable to make informed choices; that
168. See Johnson v. Martin, 28 Wash. App. 774, 775, 626 P.2d 525, 526 (1981).
169. Estate of Kelly ex rel. Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 39-40, 896 P.2d 1245, 1249
(1995).
170. See Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220, 225, 737 P.2d 661, 664 (1987).
171. See supra Part II.E.
172. Johnson, 28 Wash. App. at 775, 626 P.2d at 526.
173. See supra Part II.D.
174. See supra Part II.D.
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duty logically arises when the patron is "obviously intoxicated," or, more
appropriately, when the vendor knows or should know that the patron is
intoxicated. 75 Prior to the point of obvious intoxication, a vendor becomes responsible for injuries caused by the actions of a patron that it
cannot foresee. Even though imposing liability on a vendor may act as
an incentive to prevent drunk driving,' 76 a duty based on foreseeability of
harm should arise only when the vendor is put on notice that continuing
to serve the patron could lead to serious injury. "[N]otice of the risk...
at a time when that risk may still be reasonably dealt with is inherent in
the concept of reasonable conduct."' 177 When a patron is "obviously intoxicated," the vendor is on notice of the risk of harm,
and reasonable
78
care requires that the vendor stop serving the patron.
The preference for the "obviously intoxicated" rule is analogous to
criminal drunk driving statutes that distinguish between levels of culpability for the acts of driving "under the influence" and driving "while
intoxicated."' 179 The term "intoxication" denotes a higher degree of
drunkenness than the descriptor "under the influence."' 80 Intoxication is
defined as a "diminished ability to act with full mental and physical capabilities"; "under the influence" is defined as "depriv[ation] of clearness
of mind and self-control."' 81 The law recognizes a difference in culpability and responsibility for the same conduct depending on the extent of a
person's level of intoxication.' 82 Similarly, a commercial vendor's liability should not attach when a person is "apparently under the influence,"
but when the patron's high level of intoxication is obvious. A commercial vendor is in a position to deal with the risk of harm, and possibly
prevent harm to a third party, only when he or she is on notice of such a
risk.'83
Interestingly, courts have placed more emphasis on the requirement
of foreseeability and notice in determining liability for non-vehicular

175. See infra Part V.
176. Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457, 479, 716 P.3d 814, 826 (1986) (Utter, J., concurring).
177. Stanley H. Barer, Tavernkeeper's Liabilityfor Act of Guests, 37 WASH. L. REV. 263, 269
(1962).
178. See Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220, 225, 737 P.2d 661, 664 (1987).
179. See Act of May 28, 1991, 1991 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 290 (expanding the language for
liability for drunk driving in six provisions of the Revised Code of Washington from "driving while
intoxicated" to the broader language of "driving under the influence").
180. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 841 (8th ed. 2004).
181. Id. at 1562.
182. See Act of May 28, 1991, 1991 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 290.
183. Barer, supra note 177, at 269 (determining that "notice of the risk ... at [a] time when
that risk may still be reasonably dealt with, is inherent in the concept of reasonable conduct").

Seattle UniversityLaw Review

[Vol. 31:385

torts committed by patrons.1 84 For example, in an assault case, a vendor
will not be liable for over-serving unless the vendor is on notice of the
possibility of harm based on the patron's prior actions and the patron is
"obviously intoxicated" at the time of service.' 85 This circumstance requires a higher level of foreseeability of injury before a duty arises, even
though the act of the vendor is the same: serving an intoxicated patron.
The Barrett standard does not require notice based on prior actions or
obvious intoxication; it merely requires that the patron be "apparently
under the influence."' 86 The same emphasis on notice should be required
in determining when a vendor owes a duty to third parties who are injured by a patron who drives while impaired. Whether the instrument
that causes harm is a knife or an automobile, the requisite level of foreseeability should be the same because the act of the vendor is the same.
The Barrett decision complicated the foreseeability issue in tort
claims by lowering the standard that determines the point in time when
the vendor should recognize the potential for injury. The "apparently
under the influence" standard does not give the vendor adequate notice
of risk of harm. Not only did the court diminish the importance of foreseeability, but it also disregarded
precedent and thwarted the aims of the
87
Washington Legislature.'
D. The Court Failedto Follow Judicial
Precedentand Legislative Intent
This Section argues that the court mistakenly failed to follow the
rule it had consistently applied in determining vendor liability prior to
Barrett. This Section further contends that the court's decision is incompatible with the legislature's intent and historical pattern in alcohol sale
regulation.
1. Stare Decisis
The majority opinion in Barrett ignored that the "obviously intoxicated" standard was a well-established rule in Washington, successfully
used for years to determine when a commercial vendor is liable to third
184. The Barrett court pointed out that RCW section 66.44.200 was not designed to protect
citizens from other torts; consequently, the statute could not be used to define the duty owed to third
parties who are not harmed in automobile accidents. Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash.
2d 259, 272, 96 P.3d 386, 392 (2004).
185. Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479, 498, 780 P.2d 1308, 1316 (1989); see also Johnson v.
Martin, 28 Wash. App. 774, 776, 626 P.2d 525, 526 (1981) (declining to impose liability for assault
when commercial establishment's employees had no notice that they were serving an intoxicated
person, "let alone one who had lost his willpower").
186. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 274, 96 P.3d at 393.
187. See infra Part IV.D.
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parties for over-serving its patrons.188
In so doing, the majority violated
89
the principle of stare decisis.'
Under stare decisis, a court may not abandon an established rule of
law unless the rule is clearly "incorrect and harmful."' 90 The Barrettmajority explicitly rejected the "obviously intoxicated" standard in favor of
the "apparently under the influence" test.' 9' As Justice Sanders pointed
out in his dissent, however, the court did not even address the stare decisis issue and failed to show that the "obviously intoxicated" standard
was either incorrect or harmful. 92 Perhaps the majority ignored this issue because it knew the "obviously intoxicated" standard is not incorrect
or harmful-on the contrary, the standard provides a more just path to
imposing liability by recognizing a duty based on the foreseeability of
harm. The "obviously intoxicated"
rule should have been protected by
93
the doctrine of stare decisis.
It must be conceded that cases establishing liability for serving alcohol are "especially susceptible to reconsideration"' 194 despite the doctrine of stare decisis. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is
that, as was true during the Prohibition era, people have abandoned the
idea that "drinkers would reform themselves" and have turned to their
lawmakers for help.1 95 Regardless, the Barrettcourt did not need to stray
from the common law rule and disrupt state decisis because, even without defining liability based on a statute, a plaintiff can
always "default"
1 96
to the common law rule to establish a cause of action.
2. Legislative Intent
The court not only ignored its own precedent, which consistently
applied the "obviously intoxicated" standard, but its decision also contradicted the history of legislative intent regarding commercial vendor
liability. First, the decision reflects a resurfacing of the Washington
dramshop act repealed in 1955.197 Second, RCW section 66.44.200 was

188. See supra Part 11.E.
189. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 298, 96 P.3d at 402-03 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
190. City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wash. 2d. 384, 402 n.2, 143 P.3d 776, 785 n.2 (2006)
(quoting In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wash. 2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508, 511 (1970)).
191. Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 274, 96 P.3d at 393.
192. Id. at 298, 96 P.3d at 402-03 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
193. See City of Fircrest,158 Wash. 2d. at 402 n.2, 143 P.3d at 785 n.2.
194. Jaffe, supra note 29, at 608.
195. Hoexter, supra note 26, at 228 n.10 (citing Carla K. Smith, Note, Social Host Liabilityfor
Injuries Caused by the Acts ofan Intoxicated Guest, 59 N.D. L. REv. 445,448 (1983)).
196. DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 167, at 141. For a discussion of the common law cause of
action, see supra Part IV.B.4.
197. 1955 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 372, § 1.
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passed as a criminal
provision and was specifically silent on the issue of
98
civil liability.'
When the legislature has been inactive in a particular area of law,
the judiciary may have the freedom to "perform a creative role."' 199 In
the area of commercial vendor liability, the Washington legislature has
been quite active. 200 Although it adopted dramshop liability early on, it
later abandoned it in order to limit causes of action against commercial
vendors. 20 1 Prior to Barrett, Washington courts regularly rejected imposing liability based on "broader exceptions to the common law rule,"
when doing so would contravene the repeal of the dramshop act. 20 2 Instead, courts recognized the value in deferring to the legislature when
dealing with issues of accountability in alcohol-related accidents. 20 3 The
"apparently under the influence" standard revives the dramshop act by
once again easing the route to recovery against a commercial vendor
through the doctrine of negligence per se.
The Barrett court also flouted legislative intent by misusing a
criminal statute to define a civil negligence standard. RCW section
66.44.200 regulates the service or sale of liquor.20 4 It does not, in fact,
provide any grounds for a civil action. 20 5 Rather, the statute defines a
crime and provides for sanctions in the event of its violation.20 6 Because
the legislature is in the best position to weigh who should be held accountable for injuries caused by impaired drivers,20 7 the Barrett court
should not have inferred that the statute was intended to provide an avenue for civil liability. Barrett "blurred the distinction between tort and
crime" in this area of law in a jurisdiction that has expressly eliminated
tort actions based solely on the breach of a criminal statute.20 8
Furthermore, a negative inference can be made that the legislature
did not intend to allow negligence per se to apply to the conduct of
198. See WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.200 (2006).
199. Buckhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 389, 755 P.2d 759, 763 (1988) (citing Cornelius J.
Peck, Comments on Judicial Creativity, 69 IOwA L. REV. 1 (1983)).
200. See supra Part 11.B-C.
201. See supra Part II.B-C.
202. See Estate of Kelly ex rel. Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 37, 896 P.2d 1245, 1248
(1995).
203. Id.at 38, 896 P.2d at 1248.
204. See WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.200 (2006). But see Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc.,
152 Wash. 2d 259, 272, 96 P.3d 386, 392 (2004) (holding that "the purpose of the statute is to protect third parties from drunk driving accidents caused by a commercial host's over-service of an
adult patron"). Although the statute may have been created with the protection of bystanders in
mind, it is a criminal statute that does not suggest any form of civil liability.
205. § 66.44.200.
206. Id.;
see § 66.44.180 (2006).
207. Kelly, 127 Wash. 2d at 38, 896 P.2d at 1248.
208. Jaffe, supra note 29, at 623.
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serving alcohol. The rule of statutory construction regarding implied
negatives provides that when a statute sets forth an affirmative rule, as it
does here, it implies a negative of any alternative requirement. 209 The
legislature's specific enumeration of only four specific instances in
which negligence per se applies2 10 creates an unambiguous implication
that the legislature did not intend for the doctrine to apply to other conduct.
Statutes must be construed to avoid absurd or strained consequences. 211 Because Washington is a jurisdiction in which a civil duty
may not be established simply from the violation of a statutorily created
standard of care, the Barrett court illogically construed RCW section
66.44.200 when it permitted a civil cause of action based on this criminal
statutory language. 2
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS POSED BY
BARRETT AND A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

The Barrettdecision requires corrective legislative action that clarifies when a vendor becomes liable for a patron's harmful conduct. This
Part explains what the standard should be and why alternative standards
fail. Although compensating victims for their injuries is a central principle of tort law,21 3 this goal should not be met by allowing recovery from
defendants based solely upon their financial resources.214 In vendor liability matters, the concept and significance of foreseeability cannot be
casually disregarded, and the law should not take the emphasis off of the
primary tortfeasor, especially when the commercial vendor can be as innocent as the victim. 21 5 When the irresponsible driver is unable to pay
209. NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 24.04 (6th ed. 2002);

see, e.g., Smith v. Stevens, 77 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1870) (stating that "[i]t needs no argument or authority to show that the statute, having provided the way in which these ... lands could be sold, by
necessary implication, prohibited their sale in any other way").
210. See WASH. REV. CODE § 5.40.050 (2006).
211. Kelly, 127 Wash. 2d at 39, 896 P.2d at 1249 (quoting Wright v. Enqum, 124 Wash. 2d
343, 351, 878 P.2d 1198, 1202 (1994)).
212. See § 5.40.050.
213. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 17 (2000).

214. Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 259, 280, 96 P.3d 386, 394 (2004)
(Sanders, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that "deep pockets" do not affect a negligence analysis).
Although a vendor likely has more resources, it may not be the only source of damages under Washington's joint and several liability system. When the other tortfeasor (the driver, for example) is
insolvent, however, the vendor would still be forced to fully compensate victims. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.22.040(1) (2006) (allowing vendor to seek contribution from patron based on joint and
several liability).
215. Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457, 496, 716 P.2d 814, 834 (1986) (Durham, J.,
dissenting). In a mobile society, the law should not presume commercial vendor liability for the act
of selling a certain product, even though that legal product can become dangerous when
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for the injury he or she caused, the law should not arbitrarily look to the
establishment because it is likely to have more financial resources.
The "apparently under the influence" standard is untenable because
it shifts too much responsibility to the commercial vendor and opens the
door to unwarranted liability. Although the "obviously intoxicated" standard is consistent with the foreseeability requirement, common law, and
legislative intent, there are instances when it fails to attach liability at
times the commercial vendor should be held accountable. Sometimes
even a standard requiring clear, obvious intoxication is still not high
enough.216 Washington courts have rejected the argument that the
amount of alcohol served can determine whether a person is "obviously
intoxicated" due to the different effects alcohol can have on the body.217
Common sense suggests, however, that there must be some point at
which the quantity of alcohol served puts the vendor on notice that a patron is intoxicated despite his or her outward, obvious manifestations. 1 8
For example, under the "obviously intoxicated" standard, a waiter or
waitress might have to serve a 250-pound man who is a heavy drinker
twenty drinks before he is "obviously intoxicated., 219 Surely a reasonable person should know that a patron is probably intoxicated after even
fifteen beers, despite his or her size or tolerance; such intoxication would
likely be obvious if the patron were required to stand up or to perform
even a mundane task.2 In such a circumstance, the "obviously intoxicated" standard will not suffice to put the vendor on notice of the risk of
harm at the time of service unless the vendor required the patron to engage in some sort of sobriety test.
The standard in determining third party liability should be whether
the commercial vendor "knows or should know" that the patron is "obviously intoxicated. 221
Thus, the legislature should supplement
over-consumed. Even in areas with inadequate public transportation, a commercial vendor should
not be required to presume that every person who walks into hisor her business will drink to excess
and get behind the wheel of a car.
216. See infra Part V.
217. Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479, 490-91, 780 P.2d 1307, 1312 (1989); Purchase v.
Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220, 226 n.12, 737 P.2d 661, 665 n.12 (1987). But see Dickinson, 105 Wash.
2d at 464-65, 716 P.2d at 818 (determining that patron's admission of the amount of liquor consumed raised an issue of material fact as to whether vendor "knew or should have known" that the
driver was intoxicated).
218. See Dickinson, 105 Wash. 2d at 465, 716 P.2d at 818 (where patron was served between
15 and 20 drinks, a permissible inference arose that vendor could have observed that patron was
"obviously intoxicated").
219. See, e.g., Purchase, 108 Wash. 2d at 225, 737 P.2d at 665 (noting that a heavy drinker
may not appear intoxicated even with a high blood alcohol level).
220. See Dickinson, 105 Wash. 2d at 465, 716 P.2d at 818.
221. See, e.g., Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d 911, 916, 541 P.2d 365, 369 (1975) (explaining
that the common law rule
of negligence requires that the vendor "knew, or should have known in the
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RCW chapter 66.44 with a provision defining an objective reasonable
standard of care in the context of alcohol service. That duty should be
defined as follows:
A commercial vendor owes a duty to third parties to not serve a patron when the vendor:
(1) knows the patron is intoxicated based on the patron's
obvious, outward manifestations; or
(2) should know that the patron is intoxicated based on the
excessive quantity of alcohol served to the patron by the
vendor.
When injury to a third party results from a breach of this duty, the
third party has a civil cause of action against the commercial vendor.
Washington should adopt the reasonable person standard, indicated
by the phrase "knew or should have known," because it is an objective
standard that will be easier for practitioners, judges, and juries to apply.
Even after the court's careful analysis of what "apparently under the influence" might look like, 22 the application of the standard would be difficult to apply in comparison to the "knew or should have known" standard because it requires a jury to determine whether the patron was
"seemingly drunk., 223 The "knew or should have known" standard is
more objective and can be applied based on common experiences. It removes the subjective guesswork required to determine what "apparently
under the influence" standard means in context. While what is apparent
to one person may not be apparent to another, what is obvious to one
person is likely obvious to all. 224 Civil liability should not attach until a
reasonable person knows or should know that a patron is "obviously intoxicated," based on either his or her outward composure or on the
exercise of reasonable care, that the furnishing of liquor to [the] individual posed a foreseeable threat
of serious harm to another"); see also 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 466 (cause of action
for negligently continuing to serve alcoholic beverages incorporates common law principles in determining liability, based on whether vendor "knew or should have known" patron was intoxicated);
48A C.J.S. IntoxicatingLiquors § 647 (1981) (liability rests on whether server "knew or should have
known" patron was intoxicated).
222. Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d. 259, 268, 96 P.3d 386, 390 (2004).
223. See supra Part lI.D.
224. Although the Washington Administrative Code sets forth the guidelines for mandatory
alcohol server training, it does not provide any objective guidance on how to determine "apparent
intoxication." WASH. ADMIN. CODE 314-17-005 to -115 (2007); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 314-11-035
(2007). A provision does, however, require commercial vendors to ensure that its employees obtain
a serving permit. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 314-17-030 (2007).

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 31:385

quantity of drinks he or she has consumed. The "knew or should have
known" standard fairly puts the commercial vendor on notice and will
produce more standardized and consistent results in determining commercial vendor civil liability.
The "knew or should have known" standard is also preferable because it can put the vendor on notice of the risk of harm based on the
quantity of liquor sold. Even after serving twenty drinks, the commercial
vendor may not be able to discern a specific person's level of intoxication because the outward signs vary from patron to patron; at that point,
however, the vendor should know that the patron is intoxicated, regardless of visual cues. Whereas a standard based solely on the patron's outward manifestations might delay attaching liability until it is too late for
the vendor to prevent third party injury, the standard suggested in this
Note will mitigate this problem. Although the "obviously intoxicated"
standard was created under the theory that the vendor cannot know how
much a person has consumed prior to entering the establishment,225 a
bartender has first-hand knowledge about how much he or she has served
the patron. Thus, serving a patron an excessive quantity of alcohol
is "obviously intoxiwould put the bartender on notice that the 2patron
26
cated" despite his or her outward appearance.
When a vendor knows or should know that a patron is intoxicated
based on the "obviously intoxicated" standard or the quantity of alcohol
served, the choice not to serve the patron does not make the patron any
less dangerous behind the wheel of a car. Rather, the patron has likely
already reached a point of intoxication that would impair his or her driving skills. The vendor, however, should not be liable for serving a patron
until it has notice of the risk of harm-which the "knew or should have
known" standard encompasses. Subsequent injury becomes foreseeable
based on the vendor's conduct only if the vendor continues to serve the
patron alcohol after he or she knows or should know that the patron is
intoxicated.227 At that point, the vendor can engage in conduct that could
prevent foreseeable harm to a third party. In fact, the court has applied
the "knew or should have known" standard in the past.228 The suggested
225. Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220, 225, 737 P.2d 661, 664 (1987).
226. Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457, 465, 716 P.2d 814, 818 (1986).
227. The vendor's serving of the patron is a negligent act because the patron at this stage is so
helpless that he or she lacks the will power to say "no." See Barrett, 152 Wash. 2d at 287, 96 P.3d at
397.
228. Dickinson, 105 Wash. 2d at 465-66, 716 P.2d at 818-19 (analyzing whether the vendor
"knew or should have known" in the exercise of reasonable care that the drinker was intoxicated);
see also Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d 911, 916, 541 P.2d 365, 369 (1975) (explaining that the common law rule of negligence requires that the vendor "knew, or should have known in the exercise of
reasonable care, that the furnishing of liquor to [the] individual posed a foreseeable threat of serious
harm to another").
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standard is consistent not only with the foreseeability and notice requirements, but also with current Washington law because it does not
require the court to violate the prohibition against the doctrine of negligence per se.
A second alternative solution would be to follow the lead of those
jurisdictions that have completely eliminated the possibility of establishing liability against a commercial vendor for over-serving a patron, no
matter how "obviously intoxicated" the patron may have been at the time
of service.22 9 Although the jurisdictions that prohibit vendor liability
emphasize personal responsibility, they fail to recognize that situations
can arise when a patron is so intoxicated that he or she cannot possibly
make a reasonable decision whether to have another drink. The "knew
or should have known" standard succeeds in addressing this while also
ensuring that the vendor does not pay for the acts of others for which it is
not responsible.
A third interesting alternative is to create a fund which would compensate those victimized by impaired drivers. 230 Through this remedy, a
party injured by an impaired driver would be able to recover without imposing an undue burden on the negligent individual commercial vendor
because the entire alcohol industry would be required to contribute to the
fund, including manufacturers and distributors. 231 As a result, the standard of care owed by an individual establishment would probably be irrelevant because the costs of injury would be dispersed first from the
driver and then from this general fund. A major drawback to this concept is that it allows a commercial vendor to escape paying damages at
times when it should be held accountable. 2 Although some might consider a commercial vendor's business a high-risk privilege given the
product sold, 233 responsible vendors that do not over-serve their patrons
should not shoulder the burden of paying for the negligence of one careless establishment. For example, if a vendor consistently served "obviously intoxicated" patrons, it should be individually liable for the
resulting injuries. A compensation fund may allow a vendor to escape
229. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 35-11-1 (2007) (prohibiting causes of action against taverns);
WIS. STAT. § 125.035 (2007) (providing taverns with immunity from civil suits, with few exceptions); Prime v. Beta Gamma Chapter of Pi Kappa Alpha, 273 Kan. 828, 828, 47 P.3d 402, 403-04
(2002) (no cause of action exists against suppliers of alcohol for persons injured as a result of the
torts of intoxicated patrons, even when the patrons are minors).
230. PAUL A. LEBEL, JOHN BARLEYCORN MUST PAY: COMPENSATING THE VICTIMS OF
DRINKING DRIVERS 225 (1992).
231. Id.
232. The commercial vendor should be held accountable when it "knows or should know" that
the patron is "obviously intoxicated." See discussion supra Part V.
233. See Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 764, 458 P.2d 897, 900 (1969)
("Liquor licensees ... operate their businesses by way of privilege, rather than as of right .... ").
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responsibility for its consistent negligence resulting in third party injuries.
The compensation fund option resembles the theory behind insurance coverage-it spreads the risk of harm and cost of tort liability from
the insured (the commercial vendor) to the paying consumer. 34 Although the fund and insurance systems compensate the injured victim,
they pass the financial responsibility resulting from irresponsible drinking not only to the commercial vendor, but also to all consumers-even
the responsible consumers. While a solution based on a victim compensation fund or insurance might be attractive from a public policy standpoint because it compensates the injured, it still places the financial burden on the commercial vendor when the law should impose personal accountability on those who choose to drink to excess and get behind the
wheel of a car. A compensation fund would place
the vendor in the role
2 35
of an insurer for the irresponsible acts of others.
The confusion surrounding commercial vendor liability calls for
legislative clarity under Washington liquor control statutes and corresponding Washington Administrative Code provisions. Not only is the
standard adopted by Barrett potentially confusing to tavern owners and
restaurants because it changes a long-established rule,236 but it was also
adopted contrary to explicit statutory provisions. 237 The Barrett court
blindly adopted the statutory language of RCW section 66.44.200 without considering the "knew or should have known" alternative that is easier to apply, is more consistent with the theory of negligence, and does
not contradict the law. Although the "obviously intoxicated" standard is
preferable to the "apparently under the influence" standard, it is not the
most desirable. The Legislature needs to draw a clear line that defines
when a commercial vendor becomes liable for the acts of a patron who
drank at its establishment.

234. See LEBEL, supra note 230, at 205-06 (recognizing that the cost of liability insurance can
be spread among the customers who are part of the population that engage in commercial transactions (alcohol sales) that can result in vendor liability). Even though the consequence of high premiums for liability insurance might create an incentive for commercial vendors to follow "safer practices in the service and sale of alcohol," the imposition of tort injury costs on the business owner
does not deter impaired driving because there is no incentive-aside from criminal liability-for the
individual to avoid irresponsible drinking when he or she knows that another will pay for the harm
done. Id. at 205-06.
235. See Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wash. 2d 259, 292, 96 P.3d 386, 400 (2004)
(Sanders, J., dissenting).
236. See supra Part II.E.
237. See WASH. REV. CODE § 5.40.050 (2006).
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VI. CONCLUSION

The Barrett court made many mistakes in finding a basis for civil
liability in a criminal statute. The court was evidently trying to do something extraordinary in allowing Barrett to make this civil claim based on
his degree of injury. The highest court in Washington should know better than to author a decision that applies a standard based on a permissive
Restatement provision,238 violates this state's prohibition on negligence
per se, and essentially judicially revives Washington's repealed dramshop act. 239 Furthermore, the court not only ignored the requirement of
foreseeability, a fundamental principle of a negligence claim, but also
disregarded judicial precedent and legislative history. As a result, the
court dismantled a well-established rule to back a policy that a tort victim
should not bear the cost of his or her injury when the driver cannot
pay. 24 0

The court overlooked that "[allowing an] intoxicated adult to

hold a commercial vendor liable fosters irresponsibility." 24' Although
driving while impaired can result in tragedy and extreme monetary damages, "we should [not] sacrifice the concept of individual responsibility
as part of a crusade against furnishers of alcohol., 242 Legislative action
is necessary to clarify the standard of conduct to which third party liability attaches, in order to prevent the court from again creating a new form
of civil liability through the application of Restatement section 286. Apparently, explicit statutory language to the contrary was not enough.

238. See supra Part IV.A.
239. See supra Part V.B-C.
240. See supra Part V.
241. Cf Estate of Kelly ax reL. Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 41, 896 P.2d 1245, 1250
(1995). Although the court's reasoning refers to responsibility for injuries to the impaired driver, the
same principle should apply to injuries to third parties.
242. Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457, 499, 716 P.2d 814, 836 (1986) (Durham, J.,
dissenting).

